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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and
does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from
the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity
for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face
a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity
almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard
assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all.
We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The
intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard.
Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible
threats.I. Introduction
During the oil crisis in 1979 the Carter administration implemented a system of fuel allocation and
price controls that led to long queues at gas stations. Sometimes drivers tried to avoid the costs of
waiting by butting into line. As a result of these attempts many motorists were involved in ”fistfights
and shouting matches with one another. One motorist was shot and killed for butting into line”
(Frank, 1994, p. 31). This example neatly communicates a main message of this paper. In situations
with free riding incentives people frequently do not passively accept the free riding of others.
Instead, when they have the opportunity to punish free riders, they do so even if this is costly for
them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities.
1 The beauty of
the above queuing example is that queuing is likely to be a one-shot phenomenon. A motorist who
knocks down or even shoots a driver who is butting into line is not driven by the expectation of
future rewards. It seems much more likely that the source of the punishment is the anger that is
caused by the noncooperative behavior of the other driver. Examples like this led Hirshleifer (1987)
and Frank (1988) to the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.
A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that the above episode is not just a
single event but that free riding generally causes very strong negative emotions among cooperators
and that there is a widespread willingness to punish the free riders. Our results indicate that this
holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In
addition, we provide evidence that free riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate
from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free riders, therefore, can avoid or at least
reduce punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. This, in turn, suggests that in the presence
of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding. Testing this conjecture is the other major
aim of our paper.
For this purpose we conducted a public good experiment with and without punishment
opportunities. In the treatment without punishment opportunities complete free riding is a dominant
strategy. In the treatment with punishment opportunities punishing is costly for the punisher.
Therefore, purely selfish subjects will never punish in a one-shot context. This means that if there are
only selfish subjects, as is commonly assumed in economics, the treatment with punishment
opportunities should generate the same contribution behavior as the treatment without such
                                               
1 Note that the maintenance of a well-ordered queue constitutes a public good because all people benefit from the
queue and everybody has an incentive to outpace the others. In the absence of punishments a person is always better
off  when reducing waiting time given that others are waiting in the queue. If the queue dissolves and everybody is
trying to get served first, the best action for everybody is to also trying to get served first. If others try to get served
early while I do not, I will have a waiting time that is far above the average waiting time. However, if everybody tries
to get served first the result will be chaos and nobody will, on average, get served earlier. In addition, the unpleasant
experience of waiting under chaotic circumstances makes everybody worse off relative to waiting in a well-ordered
queue.2
opportunities. The reason is, of course, that the presence of punishment opportunities is irrelevant
for the contribution behavior if there is no punishment. In sharp contrast to this prediction we
observe vastly different contributions in the two conditions. In the no-punishment condition
contributions converge to very low levels, i.e., between 53 and 75 percent of the subjects free ride
completely in the final period while the remaining subjects contribute only little. In the punishment
condition, however, average contribution rates between 50 and 95 percent of the endowment can be
maintained. If subjects in the punishment condition have the opportunity to implicitly coordinate on a
common group standard their contributions converge to almost full cooperation: In the final period
of this treatment 82.5 percent of the subjects contribute the whole endowment although the standard
economic model predicts no cooperation at all.
 2
In our view the introductory example and the strong regularities observed in our experiments
suggest that emotion-based punishment of free riding is of general importance. It is likely to play a
role in many social interactions like, e.g., industrial disputes, in team production settings or, quite
generally, in the maintenance of social norms. If, for example, striking workers ostracize strike
breakers (Francis 1985) or if, under a piece rate system, the violators of productions quotas are
punished by those who stick to the norm (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1947, Whyte 1955), it seems
likely that similar forces are at work as in our experiments.
3 Note that in our experiments the
description of the public good and the option to punish is framed in completely neutral terms.
4 In
reality, however, free riding is frequently described in rather value laden terms. Strike breakers, e.g.,
are called ‘scabs’ and during World War I British men who did not volunteer for the army were
called ‘wimps’. The very existence and frequent use of such value laden terms suggests that
emotions are involved and can be elicited by these terms. In view of the fact that free riding is
described by such expressions emotion-based punishment may even be more important in reality than
in our experiments.
To our knowledge there is no other work that shows the widespread existence of a willingness
to punish free riding when it is costly and does not provide private material benefits for the punisher.
Nor do we know of evidence that relates this willingness to punish to the underlying negative
emotions. Our work is most akin to the seminal paper by Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992).
These authors also allowed for costly punishment. Their experiments were mainly designed for the
                                               
2 We define the standard model as characterized by the following assumptions: (i) All individuals only aim at
maximizing their own material payoff. (ii) All individuals are sequentially rational, i.e., capable of performing the
relevant backwards induction.
3 Francis’ (1985, p. 269) description of social ostracism in the communities of the British miners provides a
particularly vivid example. During the 1984 strike of the miners, which lasted for several months, he observed the
following: ”To isolate those who supported the ‘scab union’, cinemas and shops were boycotted, there were expulsions
from football teams, bands and choirs and ‘scabs’ were compelled to sing on their own in their chapel services.
‘Scabs’ witnessed their own ‘death’ in communities which no longer accepted them”.
4 The public good is called ‘project’ and punishing occurs by ‘assigning points’ (see the instructions in the appendix).3
purpose of understanding the impact of punishment opportunities in a repeated common pool
resource game and the interaction of the punishment opportunity with ex ante face to face
communication. In their experiments the group composition remained constant over time, i.e., in
each period the same subjects interacted with each other. Moreover, the number of periods was
unknown to the subjects. In addition, subjects could develop an individual reputation based on their
history of cooperation decisions. The results show that subjects indeed based their punishment
decisions on the reputation of the other subjects. Since the same group of subjects interacts for an ex
ante unknown number of periods and since individual reputation formation was possible in these
experiments there were material incentives for cooperation and for punishment. To rule out such
material incentives we eliminated all possibilities for individual reputation formation and implemented
treatment conditions with an ex ante known finite horizon. In addition, we also had treatments in
which the group composition changed randomly from period to period so that the probability of
meeting the same subject in future periods was very low. In one of our treatments we even ensured
that the probability of meeting the same subjects in the future is zero.
Our work is also related to the interesting study of Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) who show
that, if there are opportunities for ostracizing non-cooperators, rational egoists can maintain
cooperation for T-1 periods in a T-period Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this model ostracizing non-
cooperators is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium and, hence, rational for selfish group members.
This feature distinguishes the above model from our experimental set-up. In our experiments
cooperation or punishment can never be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium if rationality and
selfishness are common knowledge. We deliberately designed our experiments in this way to examine
whether people punish free-riders even if it is against their material self-interest.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we present our experimental
design in more detail. In Section III we shortly present the predictions of the standard economic
model and contrast them with the implications of our alternative behavioral assumptions. In Section
IV the major behavioral regularities of our experiments are presented. Section V interprets these
regularities in the light of our behavioral assumptions and provides evidence on the pattern of
emotional responses to free riding. Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper and provides
concluding remarks.
II. The Experimental Design
Since we hypothesize that there is a willingness to punish free riding we have to set up a public good
experiment with punishment opportunities. Moreover, since we further hypothesize that the
willingness to punish is not merely a strategic investment into the deterrence of free riding in the4
future we have to implement a design which rules out future benefits from present punishment
activities. If we observe in this environment that free riders are punished we have evidence in favor
of the above hypothesis.
A. Basic Design
Our overall design consists of a public good experiment with four treatment conditions (see
Table 1). There is a ‘Stranger’-treatment with and without punishment opportunities and a ‘Partner’-
treatment with and without punishment opportunities. In the Partner-treatments the same group of n
= 4 subjects plays a finitely repeated public good game for ten periods, that is, the group
composition does not change across periods. For each Partner-session we planned six groups of size
n = 4.
5 In contrast, in the Stranger-conditions the total number of participants in an experimental
session, N = 24, is randomly partitioned into smaller groups of size n = 4 in each of the ten periods.
Thus, the group composition in the ‘Stranger’-treatments is randomly changed from period to
period. The treatments without punishment opportunities serve as a control for the treatment with
punishment opportunities. In a given session of the Stranger-treatment the same N subjects play ten
periods in the punishment and ten periods in the no-punishment condition. Similarly, in a session of
the Partner-treatment all groups of size n play the punishment and the no-punishment condition. This
has the advantage that, in addition to across-subject comparisons, we can make within-subject
comparisons of cooperation levels which have much more statistical power. In Sessions 1 – 3 we
implemented Stranger-conditions while in Sessions 4 and 5 we implemented Partner-conditions. In
Sessions 1 and 2 subjects play first ten periods in the punishment condition and then ten periods in
the no-punishment condition. To test for spillover effects across conditions the no-punishment
condition is conducted first in Session 3. In Session 4, which implemented Partner-conditions, we
start with the punishment condition while Session 5 begins with the no-punishment condition.
Note that in the Partner-treatment the probability of being rematched with the same three
people in the next period is 100 percent while in the Stranger-treatment it is less than 0.05 percent.
Moreover, even if a subject is rematched in the next period with one of the previous group members,
our anonymity conditions ensure that the subject does not know this. Thus, due to the very low
probability of being rematched with the same subjects in future periods and due to our anonymity
conditions the Stranger-treatment comes close to pure one-shot interactions.
6 However, since the
probability of meeting the same people in the future is not exactly zero one might argue that the
                                               
5 Unfortunately, in one Partner-session only 16 subjects showed up so that we had only 4 groups of size n = 4.
6 By the term one-shot we do not mean that subjects play the public good game only once. We mean, instead, that
subjects do not have future interactions with the same group members. Therefore, repetitions of the game preserve the
one-shot character as long as the probability of future interactions with the same subjects is negligible or zero,
respectively.8
maximizers, and if this is common knowledge, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction with
regard to gi for each of the four cells in Table 1 is identical: In all four treatment conditions all
subjects will contribute nothing to the public good in all periods. This is most transparent in the
Stranger-treatment without punishment. This condition consists just of a sequence of ten (almost
pure) one-shot games. In each one-shot game players’ dominant strategy is to free ride fully.
Applying the familiar backward induction argument to the Partner-treatment without punishment
gives us the same prediction.
In the Stranger-treatment with punishment the situation is slightly more complicated because
each one-shot game now consists of two stages. It is clear that a rational money maximizer will
never punish at the second stage because this is costly for him. Since rational players will recognize
that nobody will punish at the second stage the existence of the punishment stage does not change
the behavioral incentives at the first stage relative to the Stranger-treatment without punishment. As
a consequence, everybody will choose gi = 0 at stage one. For the same reasons as in the Stranger-
treatment rational subjects in the Partner-treatment with punishment will choose gi = 0 and    i
j p  = 0
for all j in the final period. By applying the familiar backward induction argument we arrive, thus, at
the prediction that gi = 0 and    i
j p  = 0 for all j will be chosen by all subjects in all periods of the
Partner-treatment with punishment.
There is already a lot of evidence for public good games like our no-punishment condition. For
these games it is well known that cooperation strongly deteriorates over time and reaches rather low
levels in the final period (Dawes and Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995). In a recent meta-study Fehr and
Schmidt (forthcoming) surveyed 12 different public good experiments without punishment where full
free riding is a dominant strategy in the stage game. During the first periods of these experiments
average and median contribution levels varied between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment.
However, in the final period 73 percent of all individuals (N = 1042) chose gi = 0 and many of the
remaining players chose gi close to zero. In view of these facts there can be little doubt that in the
no-punishment condition subjects are not able to achieve stable cooperation. Therefore, the main
objective of our experiment is to see whether subjects are capable of achieving and maintaining
cooperation in the punishment condition.
In our view, the fact that at the beginning of the no-punishment condition one regularly
observes relatively high cooperation rates, suggests that not all people are driven by pure self-
interest. We conjecture that, in addition to purely selfish subjects, there is a nonnegligible number of
subjects who are (i) conditionally cooperative and (ii) willing to engage in the costly punishment of
free riders. This conjecture is based on evidence from many other experimental games. Bilateral
trust- or gift exchange games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Fehr and Falk 1999) indicate that
many subjects are conditionally cooperative, i.e., they are willing to cooperate to some extent if
others cooperate, too. Recently, Croson (1998) and Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (1998) have9
shown that many subjects also behave conditionally cooperative in n-person public good games.
Bilateral ultimatum and contract enforcement games (Camerer and Thaler 1995, Güth and Tietz
1990, Roth 1995, Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997) indicate that many subjects are willing to
punish behavior that is perceived as unfair. In our public goods context fairness issues are likely to
play a prominent role, too. We believe, in particular, that subjects strongly dislike being the 'sucker',
i.e., being those who cooperate while other group members free ride. This aversion against being the
'sucker' might well trigger a willingness to punish free riders.
In view of the evidence mentioned above it is reasonable to assume that there is a mix of
selfish, conditionally cooperative and punishing subjects in our experiments. The main question then
is, under which conditions the interaction between these types generates stable cooperation. What
we apparently know already is that in the no-punishment condition stable cooperation is in general
not possible. The reason for implementing a punishment condition is that it might enable punishing
types to establish and maintain cooperation. Note that in the no-punishment condition punishing
types have no direct means to discipline the selfish types. All they can do, in response to the
anticipated defection of selfish types, is to defect also. Yet, in the punishment condition they can
discipline the selfish types directly by punishing free riding. Moreover, if potential free riders are
deterred by the punishment threat, the conditional cooperators also have a reason to cooperate.
Thus, it could be that in the no-punishment condition the selfish types induce the other types to
defect also, while in the punishment condition the disciplining of the selfish types by the punishing
types induces all subjects to cooperate. Recently, Fehr and Schmidt (forthcoming) provided a more
rigorous theoretical basis for this conjecture. In their model conditionally cooperative and punishing
behavior is driven by people’s fairness motives. They show that in games like our no-punishment
condition a majority of fair-minded subjects cannot obtain cooperation in equilibrium if there is a
minority of selfish subjects. They also show that even a minority of fair-minded (i.e., punishing)
subjects can enforce an equilibrium with full cooperation in the punishment condition.
12
Both in the Stranger- and in the Partner-treatment with punishment there are no explicit
coordination opportunities. It is, therefore, difficult for subjects to form correct expectations about
the behavior of other group members and to develop a common contribution standard. This is
particularly transparent in the Stranger-treatment where subjects face new group members in each
period. Yet, in the Partner-treatment subjects experience a common group history which provides a
better basis for the formation of accurate beliefs about each others’ behavior than in the Stranger-
treatment. In the Partner-treatment with punishment it is, therefore, more likely that a behavioral
norm that differs from full free riding will evolve.10
                                                                                                                                                           
12 Heckathorn (1996) also examines a public good model with punishment opportunities. His simulations, which allow
for different strategies (types), indicate the importance of punishing types for cooperation.11
IV. Experimental Results
In total, we have observations from 112 subjects. Each subject participated only in one of the five
experimental sessions. All sessions were held in January and February 1996. Subjects were students
from many different fields (except economics). They were recruited via letters which were mailed to
their private addresses. With this procedure we wanted to maximize the chances that subjects do not
know each other.
13 An experimental session lasted about two hours and subjects earned on average $
34 - including a show-up fee of $ 12.50.
A. The Impact of Punishment Opportunities in the Stranger-Treatment
If subjects believe that in the presence of punishment opportunities free riding faces no credible
threat we should observe no differences in contributions across treatments. In sharp contrast to this
prediction we can report the following result:
RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average
contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.
Support for Result 1 is presented in Table 3. In columns two and three of Table 3 we report the
mean contribution over all ten periods in the three sessions of the Stranger-treatment. The table
reveals that in the punishment condition subjects contribute between two and four times more than in
the no-punishment condition. A nonparametric Wilcoxon matched pairs test shows that this
difference in contributions is significant at all conventional significance levels (p < 0.0001). This
result clearly refutes the hypothesis of the standard approach that punishment opportunities are
behaviorally irrelevant at the contribution stage of the game.
                                               
13 Other recruitment methods like, e.g., public recruitment in classrooms have a much higher probability that groups
of subjects who know each other participate in a particular session.12


















































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Participants of Sessions 1
and 2 first played the treatment with punishment opportunities and then the one
without such opportunities. Participants of Session 3 played in the reverse order.
Next we turn to the evolution of contributions over time. Remember that one of the most robust
behavioral regularities in sequences of one-shot public good games, like our Stranger-treatment
without punishment, is that contributions drop over time to very low levels. Our next result provides
information whether punishment opportunities can prevent such a fall in contributions:
RESULT 2: In the no-punishment condition of the Stranger-treatment average contributions
converge close to full free riding over time. In contrast, in the punishment condition
average contributions do not decrease or even increase over time.
Support for Result 2 comes from Table 3 and Figures 1a and 1b. Columns four and five of Table 3
show that, in each session, in the final period of the no-punishment condition average contributions
vary between 1.3 and 2.3 tokens.
14 In contrast, in the punishment condition average contributions
vary between 9.8 and 14.3 tokens in period ten. Thus, in the final period of the punishment condition
the average contribution is between 6 and 7.5 times higher than in the no-punishment condition.
Moreover, a comparison of column three with column five of Table 3 reveals that in the punishment
condition the average contribution in period ten is higher or roughly the same as in all periods.
                                               
14 Note that in the following the term 'final period' is always used to indicate the last period in a given treatment
condition and not only period 20 in a given session. Thus, for example, in Figure 1a the tenth period is the final
period of the punishment condition.13
Figure 1a: Average contributions over time in the Stranger-treatment 










































































Figures 1a and 1b depict the evolution of average contributions over time in both conditions. Figure
1a shows the results of Sessions 1 and 2 in which subjects had to play the punishment condition first.
While the average contribution is stabilized around 12 tokens in the punishment condition there is
immediately a significant drop in contributions in period 11.
15 This decrease in the no-punishment
condition continues until period 18 where the average contribution stabilizes slightly below 2 tokens.
Figure 1b shows the results of Session 3 in which subjects played the no-punishment condition first.
In our view Figure 1b reveals an even more remarkable fact. Whereas average contributions in the
no-punishment condition converge again towards 2 tokens they immediately jump upward in period
11 and continue to rise until they reach 13 tokens in period ten. This indicates that the existence of
punishment opportunities triggers the effectiveness of forces that completely remove the drawing
power of the equilibrium with complete free-riding. In view of this evidence it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that any model which predicts full free-riding is unambiguously rejected.
Results 1 and 2 deal only with average contributions. We are, however, also interested in the
behavioral regularities at the individual level and how they are affected by the punishment
opportunity. Result 3 summarizes the behavioral regularities in this regard.
RESULT 3: In the Stranger-treatment with punishment no stable behavioral regularity regarding
individual contributions emerges while in the no-punishment condition full free riding
emerges as the focal individual action.
A first indication for the absence of a behavioral standard in the punishment condition is provided in
Table 3. The table shows that the standard deviation of individual contributions is quite large in each
session. Moreover, the standard deviation in the final period is roughly the same as in all periods
together. This indicates that the variability of contributions does not decrease over time. The decisive
evidence for Result 3 comes, however, from Figure 2 which provides information about the relative
frequency of individual choices in the final periods of both Stranger-treatments. In the no-punishment
condition the overwhelming majority (75 percent) of subjects chose gi = 0 in the final period. Thus,
full free riding clearly emerges as the behavioral regularity in this condition.
16 In contrast, in the
punishment condition individual choices are scattered over the whole strategy space in the final
period.
17 Although the relative frequency of 12, 15 and 20 tokens is higher than that of other
contribution levels even the most frequent choice (gi = 15) only reaches a frequency of 14 percent.
                                               
15 The null hypothesis that average contributions are the same in period 10 and 11 can be rejected on the basis of a
Wilcoxon signed ranks test (p = 0.0012).
16 This holds also true if we examine the relative frequency of individual choices over the previous 9 periods. 55
percent of all choices are at gi = 0. The next frequent choices are gi = 10 (6.9 percent) and gi = 5 (5.2 percent).
17 In this regard the final period is fully representative of the previous nine periods.15
Thus, as our discussion in Section III suggests, subjects in the punishment condition were not able to
coordinate on a specific contribution level different from gi = 0.
B. The Impact of Punishment Opportunities in the Partner-Treatment
As in the Stranger-treatments our first result in the Partner-treatments relates to average
contributions over all periods:
RESULT 4: The existence of punishment opportunities also causes a large rise in the average
contribution level in the Partner-treatment.
Table 4 provides the relevant support for Result 4. A comparison of column two and column three
shows that all ten groups have substantially higher average contributions in the punishment
condition. Therefore, the difference is highly significant (p = 0.0026) according to a nonparametric
Wilcoxon matched pairs test with group averages as observations.

































Figure 2: Distribution of contributions in the final periods of the Stranger treatment with 
and without punishment16








































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Groups 1-4 (Session 4) first
played the punishment condition and then the no-punishment condition. Groups 5-
10 (Session 5) played in the reverse order.
On average, subjects contribute between 1.5 times (group 2) and 4.3 times (group 9) more in the
punishment condition. Thus, punishment opportunities are again highly effective in raising average
contributions.
With regard to the evolution of average contributions over time the data support the following
result.
RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions
converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase
and converge towards full cooperation.17
Again Table 4 provides a first indication. It shows that in the no-punishment condition the average
contribution is only slightly above 3 tokens in the final period. In sharp contrast, the average
contribution is above 18 tokens in the punishment condition. In five of the ten groups all subjects
chose the maximum cooperation of 20 in the final period of the punishment condition. Further three
groups exhibit average contributions of 19.3 or 19.5 tokens, respectively. A particularly remarkable
fact represents the final period experience of group 9. Whereas all subjects chose full defection (gi =
0) in the no-punishment condition all subjects chose full cooperation (gi = 20) in the punishment
condition.
Figures 3a and 3b show the evolution of average contributions over time. Irrespective of
whether subjects play the punishment condition at the beginning or after the no-punishment
condition, their average contributions in the final period are considerably higher than in the first
period of the punishment condition. The opposite is true in the no-punishment treatment. Moreover,
at the switch points between the treatments there is a large gap in contributions in favor of the
punishment condition. This indicates that the removal or the introduction of punishment
opportunities immediately affects contribution behavior.
18 Thus, Table 4 and Figures 3a and 3b show
that - in the Partner-treatment - punishment opportunities not only overturn the downward trend
observed in dozens of no-punishment treatments; they also show that punishment opportunities
render eight of ten groups capable of achieving almost full cooperation although - according to the
standard approach - full defection is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
A major purpose of the Partner-treatment with punishment is to enhance the possibilities for
implicit coordination. We conjectured that this might enable subjects to converge towards a
behavioral standard different from gi = 0. Result 6 shows that this is indeed the case.
                                               
18 In Session 4 and in Session 5 average contributions in period 11 are significantly different from contributions in
period 10 (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, p = 0.05 (Session 4) and p = 0.027 (Session 5)). It is particularly remarkable
that in Session 5 contributions in period 11 are even higher than in period 1 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p = 0.028).
All six groups of Session 5 contribute more in period 11 than in period 1.18






































Figure 3b: Average contributions over time in the Partner-treatment 





































RESULT 6: In the Partner-treatment with punishment, full cooperation emerges as the dominant
behavioral standard for individual contributions whereas in the absence of
punishment opportunities full free riding is the focal action.
Evidence for Result 6 is given by Figure 4 which shows the relative frequency of individual
contributions in the final periods of the Partner-treatments. In the punishment condition 82.5 percent
of the subjects contribute the whole endowment whereas 53 percent of the same subjects free ride
fully in the final period of the no-punishment condition. Moreover, in the no-punishment condition
the majority of contributions is rather close to gi = 0. The message of Figure 4 seems so
unambiguous that it requires little further comment.

































Figure 4: Distribution of contributions in the final periods of the Partner-treatment with and 
without punishment20
C. Why Do Punishment Opportunities Raise Contributions?
If there are indeed subjects who are willing to punish free riding and if their existence is anticipated
by at least some potential free riders we should observe that punishment opportunities have an
immediate impact on contributions. Figures 1 and 3 show that this is indeed the case. After the
introduction of punishment opportunities in Session 3 (see Figure 1b) and Session 5 (see Figure 3b)
there is an immediate increase in contributions. Moreover, after the removal of punishment
opportunities in Sessions 1 and 2 (see Figure 1a) and Session 4 (see Figure 3a) contributions
immediately drop to considerably lower levels. This suggests that potential free riders are indeed
disciplined in the punishment condition. A more detailed look at the regularities of actual
punishments provides further support for this view.
RESULT 7: In the Stranger and the Partner-treatment a subject is more heavily punished the more
his contribution falls below the average contribution of other group members.
Contributions above the average are punished much less and do not elicit a systematic
punishment response.
Evidence for Result 7 is provided by Figure 5 and Table 5. In Figure 5 we have depicted the average
punishment levels as a function of negative and positive deviations from the others’ average
contribution in the group. For example, a subject in the Partner-treatment, who contributed between
14 and 20 tokens less than the average, received on average 6.8 punishment points from the other
group members. The numbers above the bars indicate the relative frequency of observations in the
different deviation intervals.
Figure 5 shows that in both treatments negative deviations from the average are strongly
punished. Moreover, in the domain of negative deviations, i.e., in the three intervals below -2, the
relation between punishment and deviations is clearly negatively sloped. The figure also indicates
that there is a large drop in punishments if an individual’s contribution is close to the average, i.e., in
the interval [-2,+2].
19 Finally, the figure suggests that positive deviations are much less punished and
that the size of the positive deviation has only a weak impact on the punishment activities by other
group members.
20
                                               
19 Figure 5 also provides further support for the emergence of a common behavioral standard for individual
contributions in the Partner- but not in the Stranger-treatment. Note that 57 percent of all the individual contributions
in the Partner-treatment are in the interval [-2,+2] while only 26 percent are in this interval in the Stranger-treatment.
20 One might ask why individuals with positive deviations get punished at all. According to a post-experimental
questionnaire there are five potential reasons for this. (i) Random error. Since individuals can only err on one side at
the punishment stage (i.e., rewarding others was not possible) each error shows up as a positive punishment. (ii)
Subjects with very high individual contributions may view others’ contributions as too low even if they are above the
average. (iii) Subjects may want to earn more than others, i.e., they punish, even if others cooperate, to achieve a21
To provide formal statistical evidence for Result 7 we also conducted a regression analysis of
punishment behavior. Table 5 contains the model and the OLS-regressions separately for the
Stranger-treatment and the Partner-treatment. We also conducted Tobit regressions with the same
variables. Yet, since they are almost identical with the OLS estimates we do not report them
explicitly. The dependent variable is ”received punishment points” of a subject and the independent
variables comprise ”others’ average contribution” and the variables ”positive deviation” and
”absolute negative deviation”, respectively. Figure 5 suggests that positive and negative deviations
from the others’ average contribution elicit different punishment responses. These variables are,
therefore, included as separate regressors. The variable ”absolute negative deviation” is the absolute
value of the actual negative deviation of a subject’s contribution from the others’ average in case that
his own contribution is below the average. This variable is zero if his own contribution is equal to or
above the others’ average. The variable ”positive deviation” is constructed analogously. To model
time effects, we included period dummies in the regression. The model also includes session
                                                                                                                                                           
relative advantage. (iv) Spiteful revenge. Free riding subjects punish the cooperators because they expect to get
punished by them. (v) Blind revenge. Subjects who get punished in t-1 may assume that punishment was mainly
exerted by the cooperators. By punishing cooperators in t they may take revenge. Note that by doing this they may
punish the wrong target because our design rules out the possibility of identifying individual contribution histories.
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dummies in the Stranger-treatment and group dummies in the Partner-treatment to control for fixed
effects (see Königstein (1997)).
The results in Table 5 support the evidence from Figure 5. In both treatments the coefficient
of the ”absolute negative deviation” is positive and highly significant. Thus, the more an individual’s
contribution falls short of the average the more she gets punished. In contrast, the size of the positive
deviation has no significant impact on the size of the punishment. It is interesting that in the Partner-
treatment it is only the negative deviation that affects punishment levels systematically while the level
of the others’ average contribution has no significant impact. The low value and the insignificance of
the coefficient on ”others’ average contribution” suggests that only deviations from the average were
punished. This may be taken as evidence that in the Partner-treatment subjects quickly established a
common group standard that did not change over time. If, instead, there would have been subjects
who wanted to raise, say, the group standard one should observe that a given negative deviation
from the average is punished less the higher that average is. This is exactly what we observe in the
Stranger-treatment where the coefficient on ”others’ average contribution” is negative. The fact that
there were subjects in the Stranger-treatment who wanted to raise the group standard is consistent
with previous evidence which shows that subjects in the Stranger-treatment could not establish a
common behavioral standard.
Table 5 - The determinants of getting punished: Regression results
dependent variable:
received punishment points
























    N = 440
    F[21, 378] = 41.3***
    adj. R
2 = 0.68
    DW = 1.89
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level
and *** at the 1-percent level. To control for time and matching groups, the regression model also contains
period dummies and dummies for matching groups (i.e., session dummies in the Stranger-treatment and
dummies for each independent group in the Partner-treatment). Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Tobit estimations yield similar results.23
The pattern of punishment indicated by Figure 5 and Table 5 shows that free riders can escape or at
least reduce the received punishment substantially by increasing their contributions relative to the
other group members. The response of subjects who actually were punished suggests that they
understood this. In the Partner-treatment we observed 125 sanctions against subjects who
contributed less than their endowment. In 89 percent of these cases the punished subject increased gi
immediately in the next period with an average increase of 4.6 tokens. In the Stranger-treatment we
have 368 such cases. In 78 percent of these cases gi increased in the next period by an average of 3.8
tokens. These numbers suggest that actual sanctions were rather effective in immediately changing
the behavior of the sanctioned subjects. Subjects seemed to have had a clear understanding of why
they were punished and how they should respond to the punishment.
D. Payoff Consequences of Punishment
A major effect of the punishment opportunity is that it reduces the payoff of those with a relatively
high propensity to free ride. In the following we call those subjects ”free riders” who chose gi = 0 in
more than 5 periods of the no-punishment treatment. 20 percent of subjects in the Partner- and 53
percent in the Stranger-treatment obey this definition of a free rider. In the Stranger-treatment with
punishment opportunities the overall payoff of the free riders is reduced by 24 percent relative to the
no-punishment condition; in the Partner-treatment the payoff reduction is 16 percent. This payoff
reduction is driven by two sources. First, free riders are punished more heavily and second, they
contribute more to the project in the punishment condition. On average, free riders raise their
contributions between 10 and 12 tokens, i.e., by 50 to 60 percent of their endowment, relative to the
no-punishment condition. However, there is also a force that works against the payoff reduction for
free riders because the other subjects (the ”non-free riders”) also contribute more in the punishment
condition. This limits the payoff reduction for the free riders.
What are the aggregate payoff consequences of the punishment condition? To examine this
question we compute the difference in the average group payoff between the punishment and the no-
punishment condition and normalize this difference by the average group payoff of the no-
punishment condition. This gives us the relative payoff gain of the punishment condition. Result 8
summarizes the evolution of the relative payoff gain for the Partner- and the Stranger-treatment.
RESULT 8: In both the Stranger and the Partner-treatment the punishment opportunity initially
causes a relative payoff loss. Yet, towards the end there is a relative payoff gain in
both treatments.24
Support for Result 8 is provided by Figure 6 which shows that in both treatments the relative payoff
loss is roughly 40 percent in period 1. Yet, while there is already a relative payoff gain in period 4 of
the Partner treatment it takes 9 periods in the Stranger-treatment to also achieve a relative payoff
gain. In the final period the relative payoff gain is roughly 20 percent in the Partner- and 10 percent
in the Stranger-treatment. The payoff differences in the Partner-treatment are statistically significant.
According to a Wilcoxon matched pairs test the null hypothesis that groups’ average income in
periods 8-10 is identical across conditions can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that
group incomes are higher in the punishment condition (p < 0.029).
21
The temporal pattern of relative payoff gains exhibited by Figure 6 is due to three sources: (i) In the
Partner treatment, in particular, contributions are lower in the early periods of the punishment
condition than during the later periods. (ii) This caused much more punishment activities in the early
periods. (iii) Contributions gradually decline over time in the no-punishment condition. Taken
together, Result 8 suggests that the presence of punishment opportunities eventually leads to
                                               
21 Results are qualitatively the same if we take group incomes in period 9-10 or only in period 10.





























































pecuniary efficiency gains. To achieve these gains it is, however, necessary to establish the full
credibility of the punishment threat by actual punishments.
E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
The random group composition in each period of the Stranger treatment ensures that the probability
of meeting the same group members in future periods is very low, yet not zero. As a consequence,
the behavior of some subjects might have been affected by the expectation of meeting the same
subjects in future periods again. For example, some subjects might have been willing to punish
because they expected some, although very diluted, private benefit in terms of higher future
cooperation by the punished free riders. This motive could, of course, play no role in period ten.
However, for periods 1-9 it cannot be completely ruled out.
To see whether the small probability of meeting the same people again is behaviorally
important we conducted two Perfect Stranger-sessions. In each of the two sessions there were N =
24 subjects who played first in the punishment condition for six periods and afterwards in the no-
punishment condition for six periods.
22 In each session we ensured that every subject in a given
condition met every other subject exactly once in this condition, i.e., the probability of being
rematched was zero. Subjects were explicitly informed that they will never meet any other subject
twice.
In Figure 7 we compare the average contribution in the Stranger- and the Perfect Stranger-
treatment. Although average contributions seem to be slightly lower in the Perfect Stranger
treatment the null hypothesis of equal contribution levels cannot be rejected on the basis of Mann-
Whitney tests. In the punishment condition the null hypothesis cannot be rejected whether we take
individual contributions in period one (p > 0.30), or individual average contributions over all periods
(p > 0.29), or individual contributions in the final period (p > 0.77)
23. Likewise, in the no-
punishment condition the null hypothesis cannot be rejected irrespective of which data we take (p >
0.59 in period one, p > 0.38 in case of individual averages over all periods, p > 0.63 in the final
period).
Figure 7 shows that the big behavioral differences between the punishment and the no-
punishment condition also emerge in the Perfect Stranger-treatment. This is no surprise in view of
the punishment regularities, which are also very similar to the pattern in the Stranger-treatment. In
                                               
22 As before (see footnote 9), subjects did not know that after the first treatment (six periods) there will be a further
treatment. Note also that with N = 24 and n = 4 six periods is the maximum number of periods compatible with a zero
rematching probability.
23 The final period is given by period ten in the Stranger- and by period six in the Perfect Stranger-treatment.26
the Perfect Stranger-treatment negative deviations from the average contribution of the other group
members are as heavily punished as in the Stranger treatment while positive deviations have no
systematic impact on received punishment points. Likewise, the vast majority of punishments is
executed by the high contributors and punishment occurs even in the final period.
In our view the fact that the behavior in the Stranger- and the Perfect Stranger-treatment is very
similar indicates that our Stranger treatment represents a good approximation to true one-shot
experiments. The small probability of being rematched with the same people seems to have no
significant behavioral impact. As Figure 7 reveals the really big differences occur between the
Partner-treatment and the Stranger-treatment. This is interesting insofar as, starting with Andreoni
(1988), there has been an intensive discussion in the literature whether contributions are higher in the
Partner-treatment or not. With regard to this question our results suggest the following: “Partners”
contribute significantly more than “Strangers” if we take subjects’ average contribution over all
periods as observations (Mann-Whitney Test, p < 0.001 in both the punishment and the no-
punishment condition). However, while in the punishment condition the difference between
“Partners” and “Strangers” strongly increases over time and becomes largest in the final period (p <
0.0001), the behavioral differences decrease over time in the no-punishment condition. In period ten
Figure 7: Average contributions over time in the Partner-, Stranger-, and Perfect-






































with punishment without punishment27
of the no-punishment condition the null hypothesis of no treatment differences cannot be rejected at
the 5 percent level (p = 0.069, Mann-Whitney Test).
From a game theoretic viewpoint the large behavioral difference between “Partners” and
“Strangers” in period ten of the punishment condition constitutes a fascinating anomaly. In game
theoretic terms, i.e., in terms of available strategies and payoffs, period ten of the Partner- and the
Stranger-treatment are completely identical because the game ends afterwards. Yet, due to different
experiences subjects behave very differently in the two treatments. This highlights the importance of
experience and learning for subjects’ actual behavior.
24
V. Interpretation - Negative Emotions and Punishment
In Section III we hypothesized that the interaction between selfish, conditionally cooperative and
punishing subjects is a decisive factor in shaping the final outcomes. In the no-punishment treatment
conditional cooperators and punishing subjects have virtually no opportunities to affect the behavior
of the selfish subjects. Therefore, they have an incentive to adjust their contributions to those of the
free riders. In the punishment condition they can, however, force selfish subjects to adjust
contributions towards those levels that they consider as appropriate. As we have seen in the previous
section the punishment and the no-punishment conditions generate indeed a completely different
contribution behavior. While the majority of subjects fully free rides in the final period of the no-
punishment conditions (75 percent in the Stranger-, 53 percent in the Partner- condition), nobody
fully free rides in the Partner-treatment with punishment and only 8 percent free ride fully in the
corresponding Stranger-treatment. Thus, the behavioral evidence as summarized in Result 1 to
Result 8 is certainly consistent with the hypothesized impact of conditionally cooperative and
punishing types. Moreover, in our view it seems difficult to provide alternative explanations of the
observed behavioral regularities.
Pure altruism or warm glow altruism, for example, is not capable of explaining the widespread
punishment of free riders.
25 After all, why should an altruistic person reduce the payoffs of other
subjects? Mere confusion or subjects’ inability to reason rationally also seems to be a poor
alternative explanation. In view of the fact that free riding is punished heavily it was quite rational for
potential free riders to adjust contributions to the average contribution of other players. Likewise, if
conditional cooperators anticipate and experience higher contribution levels from the other group
                                               
24 On the importance of experience for actual behavior see also Erev and Roth (1998) and Schotter and Sopher (1998).
25 Pure altruism means that a subject’s utility is increasing in the total group payoff. In case of warm glow preferences
a subject derives a fixed amount of utility from the act of cooperation, irrespective of the payoff consequences of
cooperation. For these definitions see Andreoni (1990). Note that we do not say that pure altruism or warm glow
altruism is generally unimportant. For evidence in favor of warm glow altruism see Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997). We
‘only’ say that neglecting the drive to punish free riders means that one neglects a potentially very important force.28
members it is rational for them to also contribute more than in the no-punishment condition. The
rational anticipation of punishment for below-average contributions and the importance of the
second stage for the contribution behavior has also been confirmed by a post-experimental
questionnaire.
26
Belief-based or reinforcement learning models that rely on purely selfish preferences (Camerer
and Ho 1998, Erev and Roth 1998) also have difficulties in explaining important features of the data.
They cannot explain, e.g., why subjects’ contributions jump downwards or upwards after the first
treatment condition in an experimental session. The difficulty of explaining the jumps arises from the
fact that these models do not take into account that there are many subjects who anticipate the
presence of punishing types and the role they play in the punishment and the no-punishment
condition. If the presence of punishing types is anticipated it is, however, quite rational for the selfish
types to raise their contributions when they move into the punishment condition and to lower their
contributions when they move into the no-punishment condition.
27
In view of the punishment pattern subjects’ contribution behavior seems quite rational. A big
question is, however, why many subjects are willing to punish free riders in a one-shot context
although this is costly. This question can be subdivided into two questions: (i) What is the proximate
source of punishment? (ii) What is the ultimate, i.e., evolutionary reason for the existence of
punishing subjects? It is not the purpose of the present paper to provide an answer to the second
question.
28 With regard to the first question we believe, however, that emotions play a key role.
In our view it seems quite likely that free riding causes strong negative emotions among the
cooperators and that these emotions, in turn, trigger the willingness to punish free riders. This
hypothesis has been advanced by Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1988).
29 If it is correct we should
observe particular emotional patterns in response to free riding. To elicit these patterns we
confronted subjects with different contribution scenarios (see Table 6).
30 After they read a scenario
they had to indicate the intensity of negative feelings towards a target person on a seven point scale
(1 = ‘not at all’, ..., 7 = ‘very much’). The difference between Scenario 1 and 1’ is that the ”non-free
riders” contribute relatively much in Scenario 1 and relatively little in Scenario 1’. In Scenario 2 and
2’ subjects themselves were hypothetically put into the position of a free rider. Then they had to
                                               
26 The details of the questionnaire results are available on request.
27 To do justice to learning models we should add that no static equilibrium model is capable of explaining the time
path of contributions within a given treatment. Our argument above is not directed against learning models per se. It
just indicates the limits of purely backward looking models that assume purely selfish preferences.
28 There are a few papers that aim at providing evolutionary explanations of punishment traits in a free riding context
(Axelrod 1986, Boyd and Richerson 1992, Bowles and Gintis 1998, Sethi and Somanathan 1996). Evolutionary
explanations are also given in Güth (1995), Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1988).
29 For an interesting survey about the role of emotions in economic theory see Elster (1998).
30 As in the questionnaire that elicited the willingness to contribute conditionally subjects who participated in the
emotions questionnaire did not participate in the experiments described in Sections II - IV. For the procedures see
footnote 21.29
indicate their expectation about the intensity of the other players’ anger and annoyance. As before,
the difference between Scenario 2 and 2’ is that in Scenario 2 the other players contribute relatively
much while in Scenario 2’ they contribute relatively little.
Table 6: Emotions towards free riders - Scenarios
Emotional response: Scenarios: Results:
own emotion towards a free
rider
Scenario 1 and 1’
(numbers in brackets relate to Scenario 1’)
”You decide to contribute 16 [5] francs to the
project. The second group member contributes
14 [3] and the third 18 [7] francs. Suppose the
fourth member contributes 2 francs to the
project. You now accidentally meet this










expected feeling of others
towards oneself if oneself is
a free rider
Scenario 2 and 2’
(numbers in brackets relate to Scenario 2’)
”Imagine that the other three group members
contribute 14, 16 and 18 [3, 5 and 7] francs to
the project. You contribute 2 francs to the
project and the others know this. You now
accidentally meet one of the other members.
Please indicate the feelings you expect from









Note: Subjects had to indicate their feelings of anger and annoyance on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘not at all’ ... 7 = ‘very
much’). Scenarios 1’, and 2’, resp., were exactly the same as scenarios 1 and 2, resp., except that they were based on
the contribution levels indicated in square brackets. N=33. None of these subjects participated in the experiment.
Several results emerge from Table 6. First, the table indicates that a free rider triggers very strong
negative emotions in the other subjects if these subjects contribute relatively much (Scenario 1). The
median intensity of negative feelings in this case is 6 on a 7-point scale. Second, the negative feelings
a free rider anticipates from other subjects who contribute relatively much (Scenario 2) are even
higher. The median intensity of anticipated negative emotions even coincides with the maximum
intensity of negative emotions. Third, the (anticipated) intensity of negative emotions towards a free
rider in case that others contribute relatively little (Scenario 1’ and 2’) is smaller but still
considerable. Both the median intensity of the own negative emotion and the anticipated median
intensity of others if oneself is the free rider are 4 on the 7-point scale. Note that this decrease in the
intensity of negative emotions in Scenarios 1’ and 2’ relative to the case where others contribute30
relatively much (Scenarios 1 and 2) occurs although the free rider’s contribution is kept constant.
This shows that the intensity of negative feelings towards free riders varies with the size of the
negative deviation from others’ average contribution. The results of Table 6 show that free riding
causes strong negative emotions and that such emotions are anticipated by most people. In addition,
the emotional pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that emotions trigger punishment for the
following reasons:
First, if negative emotions trigger punishment, one would expect that the majority of
punishment activities is executed by those who contribute more against those who contribute less.
This is the case both in the Stranger- and the Partner-treatment. Between 60 and 70 percent of all
punishment activities follow this pattern. Second, remember that non-strategic punishment increases
with the size of the negative deviation from the average. This is exactly what one would expect if
negative emotions are the cause of the punishment because negative emotions are the more intense
the more the free rider deviates from the others’ average contribution. Third, if negative emotions
cause punishment, the fact that most people are well aware that they trigger strong negative
emotions (see Scenario 2 and 2’) in case of free riding renders the punishment threat immediately
credible. Therefore, we should detect an immediate impact of the punishment opportunity on
contributions at the switch points between the punishment and the no-punishment condition.
Remember that this is exactly what we observe. The introduction (elimination) of the punishment
opportunity leads to an immediate rise (fall) in contributions (see Figures 1 and 3). Taken together,
these regularities support the view that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides evidence that spontaneous and uncoordinated punishment activities give rise to
heavy punishment of free riders. In the Perfect Stranger- and the Stranger-treatment this punishment
occurs although it is costly and provides no or virtually no future private benefits for the punishers.
The more an individual negatively deviates from the contributions of the other group members the
heavier is the punishment. Therefore, the punishment opportunity gives rise to credible threats
against potential free riders and causes a large increase in contributions: Very high or even full
cooperation can be achieved and maintained in the punishment condition whereas the same subjects
converge towards full defection in the no-punishment condition. We do not know of many instances
in which a variation in the behavioral environment that should - according to the standard economic
approach - have no effect, causes such a large behavioral difference. We also provide evidence that31
free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperating subjects. Moreover, the pattern of
emotional responses to free riding is consistent with the hypothesis that negative emotions trigger the
willingness to punish.
In our view emotion-based punishment of free riding also plays an important role in real life. It
seems, for example, rather likely that many drivers feel an impulse to punish those who are butting
into line, that - under team production - shirking workers elicit strong disapproval among their peers,
and that strike breaking workers face the spontaneous hostility of their striking colleagues. The
enormous impact of the punishment opportunities on contributions in our experiment suggests that a
neglect of the widespread willingness to punish free riders faces the serious risk of making wrong
predictions and, hence, giving wrong normative advice. Institutional and social structures that,
theoretically, trigger the same behaviors in the absence of the willingness to punish may cause vastly
different behaviors if the willingness to punish is taken into account.32
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Appendix: Instructions
The following instructions were originally written in german. We document the instructions we used
in the stranger-treatment, were we first played the two-stage-game with punishment opportunities
and second the one-stage, ordinary voluntary contributions game. The instructions in the other
treatments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request.
You are now taking part in an economic experiment which has been financed by various foundations for research promotion. If you
read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is
therefore very important that you read these intructions with care.
The instructions which we have distributed to you, are solely for your private information. It is prohibited to communicate with
the other participants during the  experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall
have to excluded you from the experiment and from all payments.
During the experiment we shall not speak of Francs but rather of Guilders. During the experiment your entire earnings will be
calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment the total amount of guilders you have earned will be converted to Francs at the
following rate:
1 Guilder = 5 Rappen
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 25 Guilders at the beginning of the experiment (as well as the 15 Francs for
participating). This one-off payment can be used to pay for eventuell losses during the experiment. However, you can always
evade losses with certainty through your own decisions. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment
plus the lump sum payment and the 15 Francs will be immediatley paid to you in cash.
The experiment is divided into different periods. In all, the experiment consists of 10 periods. In each period the participants are
divided into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition of the groups will change
by random after each period. In each period your group will therefore consist of different participants.
In each period the experiment consists of two stages. At the first stage you have to decide how many points you would like to
contribute to a project. At the second stage you are informed on the contributions of the three other group members to the project.
You can then decide whether or how much to reduce their earnings from the first stage by distributing points to them.
The following pages describe the course of the experiment in detail:
Detailed Information on the Experiment
The first Stage
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 tokens. In the following we call this his or her endowment. Your task
is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a project and
how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail below.
At the beginning of each period the following input-screen for the first stage will appear:2
The number of the period appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right corner you can see how many more seconds
remain for you to decide on the distribution of your points. Your decision must be made before the time displayed is 0 seconds.
Your endowment in each period is 20 tokens. You have to decide how many points you want to contribute to the project by typing a
number between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided
how many points to contribute to the project, you have also decided how many points you keep for your self: This is (20 - your
contribution) tokens. After entering your contribution you must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing the
Enter - key). Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised.
After all members of your group have made their decision the following income screen will show you the total amount of points
contributed by all four group members to the project (including your contribution). Also this screen shows you how many Guilders
you have earned at the first stage.
The Income Screen after the first stage:
Your income consists of two parts:
1) the tokens which you have kept for yourself (“Income from tokens kept”) whereby;
1 token = 1 Guilder.
2) the “income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0.4 x the total contribution of all 4 group members to the project.
Your income in Guilders at the first stage of a period is therefore:
(20 - your conribution to the project) + 0.4*(total contributions to the project)
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this means that each group member receives the
same income from the project. Suppose the sum of the contributions of all group members is 60 points. In this case each member of
the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*60 = 24 Guilders. If the total contribution to the project is 9 points, then each
member of the group receives an income of 0.4*9 = 3.6 Guilders from the project.
For each point, which you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Guilder. Supposing you contributed this point to the project
instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by one point. Your income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4
points. However the income of the other group members would also rise by 0.4 points each, so that the total income of the group
from the project would rise by 1.6 points. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the other group
members. On the other hand you earn an income for each point contributed by the other members to the project. For each point
contributed by any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 points.
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view the income screen. If you are finished
with it before the time is up, please press the continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing the Enter key). The first stage
is then over and the second stage commences.3
The second Stage
At the second stage you now see how much each of the other group members contributed to the project. At this stage you can also
reduce or leave equal the income of each group member by distributing points. The other group members can also reduce your
income if they wish to. This is apparent from the input screen at the second stage:4
The input screen at the 2nd stage
Besides the period and time display, you see here how much each group member contributed to the project at the first stage. Your
contribution is displayed in blue in the first column, while the contributions of the other group members of this period are shown in
the remaining three columns. Please note that the composition of the groups is renewed in each period. Besides the absolute
contributions, the contribution in percent of the endowment is also displayed.
You must now decide how many points to give to each of the other three group members. You must enter a number for each of
them. If you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. For your decision you have 180
seconds in the first two periods and 120 seconds in the remaining periods. You can move from one input field to the other by
pressing the tab -key (ﬁ‰) or by using the mouse.
If you distribute points, you have costs in Guilders which depend on the amount of points you distribute. You can distribute
between 0 and 10 points to each group member. The more points you give to any group member, the higher your costs. Your total
costs are equal to the sum of the costs of distributing points to each of the other three group members. The following table
illustrates the relation between distributed points to each group member and the costs of doing so in Guilders.
points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
costs of these points 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30
Supposing you give 2 points to one member this costs you 2 Guilders; if you give 9 points to another member this costs you a
further 25 Guilders; and if you give the last group member 0 points this has no costs for you. In this case your total costs of
distributing points would be 27 Guilders (2+25+0). Your total costs of distributing points are displayed on the input screen. As
long as you have not pressed the O.K. button you can revise your decision.
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his or her income. However if you give a member 1 point
(by choosing 1) you reduce his or her income from the first stage by 10 percent. If you give a member 2 points (by choosing 2) you
reduce his or her income by 20 percent, etc. The amount of points you distribute to each member determines therefore how much
you reduce their income from the first stage.
Whether or by how much the income from the first stage is totally reduced depends on the total of the received points. If somebody
received a total of 3 points (from all other group members in this period) his or her income would be reduced by 30 percent. If
somebody received a total of 4 points his or her income would be reduced by 40 percent. If anybody receives 10 or more points
their income from the first stage will be reduced by 100 percent. The income from the first stage for this member would in this case
be reduced to zero. Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows:
Total income (in Guilders) at the end of the 2nd stage = period income =
 = (income from the 1st stage)*(10 - received points)/10 - costs of your distributed points
if received points < 105
= - costs of your distributed points
if received points ￿ 10
Please note that your income in Guilders at the end of the second stage can be negative, if the costs of your points distributed
exceeds your (possibly reduced) income from the first stage. You can however evade such losses with certainty through your
own decisions!
After all participants have made their decision, your income from the period will be displayed on the following screen:
The income screen at the end of the 2nd stage
The calculation of your income from the first period, the costs of your distribution of points and your income in the period are as
explained above. Do you have any further questions?
Control Questionaire
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Nobody (including yourself) contributes any point to the  project at the
first stage. How high is:
Your income from the first stage?...........
The income of the other group members from the first stage?...........
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. You contribute 20 points to the project at the first stage.  All other
group members each contribute 20 points to the project at the first stage. What is:
Your income from the first stage?...........
The income of the other group members from the first stage?...........
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. The other three group members contribute together a total of  30
points to the project.
a) What is your income from the first stage if you contribute a further 0 points to the project?...........
b) What is your income from the first stage if you contribute a further 15 points to the project?...........
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. You contribute 8 points to the project.
a) What is your income from the first stage if the other group members together contribute a further total of 7  points to the
project?...........6
b) What is your income from the stage if the other group members together contribute a further total of 22 points  to
the project?...........
5. At the second stage you distribute the following points to your three other group members: 9,5,0. What are  the total costs
of your distributed points?...........
6. What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 points?...........
7. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total of 0 points from  the
other group members?...........
8. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total of 4 points from  the
other group members?...........
9. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total of 15 points  from the other
group members?...........
After the 10th period, subjects received the following sheet:
We will now repeat this experiment with one change. As before, the experiment consists of ten periods and in each period you have
to make a decsion how many of the 20 tokens at your disposal you want to contribute to the project (and, implicitly, how many you
keep for yourself).
The change
The second stage is removed. In the following ten periods there will be only the 1st stage, which is identical to the first stage
before. Your income in Guilders in these second sequence of ten periods will be calculated exactly as before.
After the end of these 10 periods, the whole experiment is definitely finished and you will get:
Your income in guilders from the first set of 10 periods
+ Your income in guilders from the second set of 10 periods
= Total income in Guilders
+ 15 Swiss Franks show-up fee